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ABSTRACT
South Africa has had a policy of competitive tendering for the provision of public 
transport services (subsidised commuter bus services) since the mid-1980s. Although 
this policy approach was conceptualised by the previous government, prior to the 
transfer of political power in 1994, it was reaffirmed in a 1996 White Paper on National 
Transport Policy. Despite the nearly 25 years that have passed since the intention to 
tender services, only about 32% of the subsidy budget is currently spent on some form 
of contracting. The majority of services are still operated on authorisations (interim 
contracts) which formalised services that operators were operating pre-1994. The 
purpose of this paper is to analyse the reasons why public transport contracting policy 
progress has been so slow in South Africa. The paper relies on an extensive study 
that was conducted regarding policy implementation obstacles in general, as well as 
a questionnaire survey among the subsidised commuter bus operators to solicit their 
views on the reasons for the delay in the implementation of the contracting system 
in the country. The findings of the survey indicate that the major issues hindering the 
implementation of the contracting system are to be found in a lack of funding, lack of 
capacity to implement policy and major operational issues in the permit offices. 
INTRODUCTION
South Africa’s public transport policy in brief
Public transport (PT) policy objectives in South Africa are mainly found in the White Paper 
on National Transport Policy of 1996 and ensuing legislation such as the National Land 
Transport Transition Act of 2000 (NLTTA) and the National Land Transport Act of 2009 that 
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replaced the NLTTA. In later years a number of strategy documents were developed in 
support of the overall policy objective of improving public transport services in South Africa 
(Department of Transport, 2007a; Department of Transport, 2007b). The White Paper on 
National Transport Policy of 1996 (Department of Transport, 1996) however still remains 
valid, although now more than 15 years old, as the overall public transport policy objectives 
have not changed over this time.
The White Paper on National Transport Policy did not specifically make reference to commuter 
bus transport but dealt with it as part of the total passenger transport sector. The White 
Paper also envisaged the devolvement of effective and efficient planning, implementation, 
funding, regulation and law enforcement of the passenger transport system to the lowest 
competent level. The White Paper also states an objective of ensuring sustainable and 
dedicated funding for passenger transport.
Various other objectives for the bus sector were (quoted from Mitchell, 2009:201):
•	 ‘Provide	spatial	reorientation	to	promote	public	transport	over	private	cars
•	 Ensure	 economic	 viability	 of	 bus	 services	 requiring	 minimum	 financial	 support	 with	
improved access to work opportunities
•	 Address	 customer	 needs	 for	 safe,	 accessible,	 affordable	 and	 reliable	 bus	 transport	
services
•	 Implement	a	system	of	regulated	competition	based	on	passenger	transport	plans	and	
tendered contracts 
•	 Promote	coordinated	and	integrated	bus	transport	services’
Promote environmentally sensitive and energy-efficient bus transport services
Against this high level policy background the following section briefly highlights the 
progress that has been made with policy implementation in the subsidised commuter bus 
transport sector. 
Progress with the implementation of the public transport policy 
Following	the	1996	White	Paper,	and	as	an	interim	measure	to	assist	companies	to	‘get	
fit’	and	ready	for	the	tendering	system,	the	government	concluded	interim	contracts	with	
all subsidised operators in 1997. In essence, these contracts placed their existing services 
within the framework of a contract with all the rights and privileges associated with a 
contract of this nature. The intention was that these contracts would last up to three years 
before	the	operator’s	services	were	to	be	put	out	to	tender;	they	were	never	intended	to	
be long-term contracts.
Organised labour, however, objected to the competitive tendering regimen as it felt that 
labour would be prejudiced through lay-offs and a reduction in wages (through competitive 
pressure) and lack of continuity of employment as operators lost and gained services. 
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This resulted in a tri-party Heads of Agreement (HoA)1 between organised labour, the 
Department of Transport and the organised industry through its trade association the 
Southern African Bus Operators Association (SABOA). The agreement, among others, 
compelled any operator that obtained a competitively sourced tender to employ at least 
75% of the required workforce from the incumbent operator, built in measures relating to 
retrenchment costs of those employees not offered jobs by the new operator; and made 
provision for a 10% right of first refusal that would give the incumbent operator a better 
chance to gain back its business in a competitive environment so as to provide for continuity 
of employment. 
The tendering system began at a slow pace in 1997 and lasted until 2002 when government 
announced a moratorium on further tenders due to a lack of funds and the fact that 
integrated transport plans were not in place (a legislative requirement at the time – the 
Land Transport Transition Act of 2000 [NLTTA]) in terms of which services had to be put 
out to tender. During this period organised labour voiced their continued objection to the 
tendering system after it was determined that in some contracts labour lost between 37% 
and 75% of their original wages when switching from one operator to another (Walters & 
Cloete, 2001) as well as losing all accumulated benefits in the switching. The dispute about 
the HoA has, after nearly 12 years and about 50 engagement processes between the tri-
party role players, not been resolved and the country has not seen another competitively 
sourced subsidised public transport service since then.
The NLTTA, however, made provision for negotiated contracts under certain circumstances, 
for instance, to encourage previously disadvantaged individuals to participate in the system 
and majority black ownership within two years of commencement of the contract. Hensher 
and	Stanley	(2010)	describes	negotiation	as	the	process	‘through	which	parties	perceive	one	
or	more	incompatibilities	between	them,	and	work	to	find	a	mutually	acceptable	solution’.	
In South Africa, the parties to the negotiations involve the transport operator, organised 
labour and the relevant transport authority. In this regard, a number of negotiated contracts 
were concluded in the early 2000s. With these types of contracts the HoA are not applicable 
as	 the	 incumbent	bus	company’s	 labour,	 its	management	and	the	 responsible	provincial	
authority jointly agree on the labour conditions within such a contract. In some cases this 
led to a moratorium on retrenchments for one year following the beginning of operations. 
In 2009 a new National Land Transport Act (Department of Transport, 2009) was enacted 
which makes provision for both tendered and negotiated contracts, and strengthened 
the principle of negotiated contracts, e.g. that such a contract could follow a currently 
1 Due to the complexity of the transition between interim contracts and tendered contracts, especially the labour 
issues, the Department of Transport decided to formalise the transitional arrangements (between interim and 
tendered contracts) by means of an agreement between organised labour, the Southern African Bus Operators 
Association (SABOA), and the Department of Transport. This became the Tripartite Heads of Agreement (HoA) 
that guided the industry and the DoT on policy implementation. The HoA was signed in 1999.
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tendered service. This Act placed public transport matters firmly at the local authority level 
of government (metros and local municipalities) and also made provision for negotiated 
contracts with a duration of up to 12 years. Other competitively sourced contracts would 
be seven years in duration. Another principle embodied in the Act is that integrated 
transport plans need to be developed so that the various types of service providers (bus, 
rail and taxi) operate in an integrated and coordinated manner in delivering their services. 
The avoidance of the duplication of service delivery and subsidies is another objective of 
Integrated Transport Plans (ITPs).
The progress with the development of ITPs has been very slow, although most major 
metropolitan areas have made some progress. Nowhere in the country, to the best of the 
authors’	knowledge,	has	any	negotiation	process	with	 incumbent	operators	been	put	 in	
place to discuss the drafting of such plans, or to discuss the principles embodied in the 
plans. In the smaller municipalities major problems are being experienced regarding the 
expertise to develop, implement, manage and monitor such plans. 
In anticipation of contracts based on integrated transport plans, any contract that expires (most 
have by now) is renewed on a short-term month-to-month basis and in some circumstances 
on a three- and six-monthly basis. A summary of the various forms of contracting (tendered,2 
negotiated3 and interim contracts4) is depicted in Table I. The differences in approach between 
tendered and negotiated contracts are summarised in Table II.
Table I: Contract systems in place in South Africa
Type of contract
Number of 
buses
Contract characteristics Duration
Interim contracts
± 3 849 (68% 
of subsidy 
budget)
•	 Foreseen	as	transition	
arrangement in 1997
•	 1-3	years	originally
•	 In	practice	some	interim	
contracts are 15 years old
Tendered contracts
± 1 834 (28% 
of subsidy 
budget)
•	 Based	on	standard	contract	
document
•	 Mostly	‘standalone’	services	
in rural/urban operations
•	 5	years	originally	
•	 Contracts	are	being	extended	
to 7 years
•	 New	contracts	to	be	7	years
•	 Most	contracts	are	currently	
on a month-to-month basis
Negotiated 
contracts
250
•	 Mostly	applicable	to	state-
owned and operated 
bus companies (form of 
privatisation)
•	 5	years	originally
•	 New	contracts	to	be	7	years.	
•	 Some	contracts	on	a	month-
to-month basis
Sale of bus 
entity through 
negotiation based 
on service contract 
specification (form 
of privatisation)
1 050
•	 Applicable	to	bus	operations	
at local and provincial 
government levels
•	 Contracts	are	5	years	in	
duration 
•	 New	contracts	to	be	7	years	
•	 Implemented	in	the	City	of	
Durban (June 2003) and North 
West Province (January 2004)
Source: Compiled by the authors for the purpose of this paper (SABOA and DoT sources) (2006 data)
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Table II: Differences in approach between tendered and  
negotiated contract systems in South Africa 
Tendered contracts Negotiated contracts
Authority Authority decides to tender services Authority decides to negotiate services after approval from Minister of Transport
Public involvement None, except to determine route network inputs
Notice to negotiate contract is published in 
the Government Gazette and other written 
media
Operators
Operators tender against each other 
for the service
A 10% right of first refusal for the 
incumbent operator
Contract is negotiated with the incumbent 
operator but put out to some form of 
competitive bidding when services are 
privatised by the provincial or municipal 
operators.
No right of first refusal for the incumbent 
operator where the services are privatised
Labour
Not involved in tendering companies 
prior to such companies tendering
A	‘clean	break’	in	service	provision,	
even though the same operator 
may win the contract. This causes 
instability in the labour force
Involved in tender discussions prior to the 
finalisation of the contract
Continuous employment with the same 
operator, with the same conditions of 
employment for those employees offered 
employment. The same employer criterion 
is not however necessarily the case in 
parastatal and municipal operators if their 
owners decide to privatise these companies
Conditions of 
service labour
Negotiated after award of the tender 
with representative unions
Representative unions are consulted prior 
to the awarding of the negotiated contract
Vehicle 
specification
Determined in the tender 
specification contract
Determined in the tender specification 
contract
Service 
specification
Determined in the tender 
specification contract
Determined in the tender specification 
contract with the potential for variation as a 
result of the negotiation process
Contract duration Seven year contracts Twelve year contracts
Contract 
monitoring
Independent monitoring company 
appointed by Authority
Independent monitoring company 
appointed by Authority
Subsequent 
rounds of tenders
Tendered service will be tendered 
upon expiry
Negotiated contracts once only, thereafter 
the services are tendered 
Tender 
documentation
Documentation compiled by a service 
provider on behalf of the Authority
Documentation compiled by a service 
provider on behalf of the Authority
Source: Adapted from Walters & Cloete (2007)
In summary of this section, an outline of the current policy process is provided in the diagram 
shown in Figure 1. 
2 Tendered contracts: Public transport services that operators tender for in the open market, based on a 
service design
3 Negotiated contracts: Services that are negotiated with potential operators based on a service design by a 
transport authority. These could also be gross or net based.
4 Interim contracts: Contracts concluded with subsidised operators in 1997 as a transitional measure to tendered 
and negotiated contracts. These contracts were based on the original services offered by the operators at the 
time,	and	were	intended	as	a	transitional	measure	to	assist	operators	to	‘get	fit’	for	the	tendering	system.
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Figure 1: Public transport policy milestones
From the brief summary above it can be seen that the process of competitive tendering 
has picked up significant opposition and is currently not an option that can be realistically 
considered. In addition to the HoA issues, there is now a further problem with competitive 
tenders in that the DoT believes that, based on current South African labour legislation,5 
all	employees	of	incumbent	operators	should	be	transferred,	based	on	the	‘going	concern’	
business principle, to the new operator. This view is also supported by organised labour 
and the Department of Labour (DoL). This poses major issues regarding surplus personnel 
in right-sized contracts; the disclosure of sensitive remuneration information to a range of 
bidders so that they can take this into consideration when bidding; the splitting of personnel 
between various contracts should an existing contract be split into smaller parts; operators 
facing various labour dispensations within the same operating environment; and the impact 
on tender efficiency factors and tender costs. 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
This paper aims to achieve two objectives: first, to summarise the main findings of a major 
study into public transport policy in South Africa undertaken in 2009; and secondly, to 
compare these findings with information gained from an industry survey among subsidised 
bus operators regarding their views on the slow implementation of the public transport 
contracting system in South Africa.
5 See section 197 of the Labour Relations Act, No 66 of 1995 (as amended) upon which the DoT, DoL and 
organised labour base their view.
41
Problems with the Implementation of Bus Transport Contracting in South Africa
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
To achieve the first research objective a summary is provided (only of the public transport 
policy section of the research project) of a detailed study undertaken in 2009 by Mitchell 
(2009) following a mixed methods research methodology approach into the effectiveness of 
South African policy-making, the policy-making process and the contextual forces shaping 
and influencing policy decisions. In this regard, detailed interviews were conducted with a 
range of stakeholders in government, academia, consultants and industry. The methodology 
also involved a questionnaire to council or board members of representative groupings of 
particular bodies involved in the transport policy facets being analysed.6  
As the Mitchell study only focused on the macro policy objectives, the second objective is 
to research the opinions of the major subsidised bus operators in South Africa to provide 
a more detailed overview of the strategic, tactical and operational issues that underpin 
the slow implementation of the contracting regimen in South Africa. These operators were 
identified as they are involved in the day-to-day management of bus services and are at 
the	‘coalface’	of	operating	bus	services	on	contract	to	government.	Most,	if	not	all,	of	these	
operators have years of experience of public transport contracting and were involved in 
the initial stage of interim contracts followed by tendered and negotiated contracts. Many 
are still operating on interim contracts concluded in 1997. A survey response rate of 83% 
(15 completed surveys) was achieved. The survey results are representative of the larger 
contract operators in South Africa representing an estimated 5 766 buses (or 83%) of all 
contracted buses.
THE MACRO POLICY FINDINGS – THE MITCHELL STUDY
The Mitchell study (2009) had as its purpose the comparison of the policy-making practices 
of government over two policy periods, viz. the 1985–1994 period and the post-liberation 
period, 1994–2006. In his research Mitchell focused on two policy areas, namely commuter 
bus policy and national roads policy. For the purpose of this paper only the findings relating 
to the commuter bus policy in the second time period is taken into account as this is also 
the time period (compared to the 1985–1994 era) during which the most progress has been 
made (albeit slow) with the implementation of a contracting system for the commuter bus 
industry.
Mitchell (2009: 267) found that there was general agreement among respondents in the 
study that on the whole commuter bus transport policy was not adequately implemented in 
South Africa. The study also found that the main reason for the unsuccessful implementation 
6	More	details	about	the	research	methodology	can	be	found	in	Chapter	8	of	Mitchell’s	study	entitled:	A	critical	
analysis of selected aspects of South African Transportation Policy (2009)
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was the lack of political will and leadership skills within authorities. Policy implementation 
had also been attempted through a top-down approach by government through the 
bureaucracy. Other reasons included the poor follow-through with implementation 
endeavours, un-coordinated crisis management of transport problems and the lack of 
consultation with, and readiness to recognise the views of other stakeholders. Mitchell 
(2009: 267-68) further suggests that the lack of political continuity, leadership, government 
capacity and bureaucratic sustainability was a large factor in the poor record in respect of 
public transport policy implementation. 
Mitchell	also	found	that	there	was	almost	universal	agreement	‘…	that	particularly	for	public	
transport policy, a lack of commitment by implementing agencies had hindered policy 
implementation	as	did	bureaucratic	and	institutional	jealousies’.	Added	to	this	there	was	‘a	
lack	of	realism	in	the	ability	to	implement	the	policy	during	the	policy	formulation	process’	
(Mitchell, 2009: 268).
Finn and Walters (2010) in their Thredbo 11 Workshop Report on public markets in 
development identified a number of strategies that are necessary for the implementation 
of public transport strategies and policy. Some identified were appropriate and capacitated 
institutional structures, adequate funding, continuity and institutional memory, and that it 
was important to set realistic goals and expectations and to avoid over-promising transition. 
The lack of correlation between these findings and that of Mitchell is evident. 
Mitchell (2009: 277-78) also found that scope for improvement existed in the following 
areas of policy analysis and policy-making in South Africa:
•	 To	improve	the	understanding	of	the	nature	of	public	policy,	and	of	the	policy-making	
process among senior bureaucracy in government and politicians
•	 To	timeously	identify	transport	problems	and	issues	for	the	transport	policy	agenda
•	 To	factually	analyse	all	possible	policy	options	and	pay	sufficient	attention	to	the	potential	
unintended consequences of the various proposals 
•	 To	obtain	sufficient	input	from	the	broader	transport	society	in	the	policy	agenda-setting	
process in order to take cognisance of the heterogeneity of South African society
•	 To	give	adequate	attention	to	government’s	capacity	to	implement	policy	in	developing	
transport policy proposals
•	 To	fully	understand	the	funding	implications	of	especially	bus	commuter	policy	before	
the policy is adopted
•	 To	regularly	monitor	transport	policy	implementation.
In	 defence	of	 the	 lack	 of	 progress	with	 policy	 implementation,	Mitchell	 states	 that	 ‘the	
commuter bus transport policy is more complex, has more variables (than other policies 
such as national roads – qualification by author of this paper) influencing implementation 
and	has	more	human	and	political	involvement/interference’	(Mitchell,	2009:	324).
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From the above summary of the findings of the Mitchell study it can be concluded that a 
lack of leadership and political will, capacity to implement the policy, and funding issues 
were some of the main overriding issues that impacted negatively on the implementation 
of macro public transport policy in South Africa. These findings, read together with the 
Finn and Walters (2010) factors that are considered necessary for the implementation 
of strategies and policies, are corroborated in the survey of subsidised operators in the 
following section of this paper.
SUBSIDISED BUS OPERATORS SURVEY
The main findings of the Mitchell study were used to develop a questionnaire that was 
sent to subsidised operators in the industry to gather their opinions as to why the policy 
implementation process has been so slow. During June/July 2011, 18 questionnaires 
were emailed to the largest operators involved in subsidised service contracts (tendered, 
negotiated and interim contracts). Regular follow-up calls were made to these operators 
to remind them to complete the questionnaires. Table III represents the split between 
the various contracting forms and the associated number of buses contracted among the 
surveyed companies.
Table III: Summary of contract type and number of buses per type of contract
Contract type Number of contracts Number of buses
Percentage of bus 
fleet under contract
Interim contract 25 4 101 71.1%
Tendered contract 19 1 174 20.4%
Negotiated contract 10 491 8.5%
Total 54 5 766 100%
Source: Survey results 
Note: The number of buses for interim contract operators will not necessarily compare with the figures of 
Table I as the latter was compiled in 2006. Operators have in the meantime expanded their fleets to meet 
increasing demand for services 
It can be seen that the majority of buses captured in the survey are still operated on interim 
contracts that were originally concluded in 1997. This is a clear indication of a lack of policy 
implementation.
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
1. The most important governance issues regarding the implementation of the 
 contracting system
Stanley and Longva (2010: 81) noted that the Thredbo 11 workshop participants, when 
considering	 a	 successful	 contracting	 setting,	 were	 of	 the	 opinion	 that	 in	 ‘judging	 a 
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successful contractual setting were procedural criteria, which refers to various governance 
arrangements in preparing and implementing the contract and shaping the relationship 
between	purchaser	and	provider’.	To	determine	which	governance	 issues	were	believed	
to be the major stumbling blocks to the implementation of the public transport policy, 
respondents were required to rate a number of issues on a 5-point Likert-type scale. The 
response format was anchored not important (1) and very important (5). The combined 
responses of the respondents were then averaged per issue as portrayed in Figure 2. 
Source: Survey results from 15 subsidised operators
Note: The combined responses of respondents (per issue) were averaged for each issue area
Figure 2: Most important governance issues impacting on the  
implementation of the public transport contracting system in SA
It	can	be	seen	from	Figure	2	that	the	most	important	governance	issues,	from	an	operator’s	
perspective, influencing the implementation of the contracting system are (1) the inability 
of	permit	offices	 to	deal	effectively	with	operators’	 licences	 (renewal,	extension	and	new	
licenses) (4.47 average rating); (2) a lack of continuity of personnel to implement provincial 
transport policies (also often referred to as a lack of institutional memory) (4.07 average 
rating); (3) a lack of policy direction at the provincial level of government (4.07 average rating); 
(4) the slow progress made with integrated transport plans – these plans were envisaged in 
the Land Transport Transition Act of 2000 but to date none have been implemented (4.00 
average rating); (5) the lack of direction (guidance) on the integration of the various public 
transport modes (3.93 average rating); (6) a poor adjudication process in dealing with permit 
applications (3.93 average rating); (7) inadequate institutional structures to deal with public 
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transport at the local (municipality/metro) level of government (3.93 average rating); (8) a 
continuously changing policy framework (3.93 average rating) and (9) a lack of a coordinated 
and integrated approach among provinces and the DOT (3.93 average rating). 
These issues point to significant policy failure, both at the operational level (permit issues) 
as well as at the tactical level of implementation at the local/metro and provincial levels 
of government. The lack of continuity (continuously changing role players) inadequate 
institutional structures and skills pose a further fundamental problem to the delivery of 
the policy. 
2. General complexities impacting the implementation of the contracting system
In the following section the most important general stumbling blocks related to the 
implementation of the public transport contracting system (tendered and negotiated) are 
discussed.	Figure	3	depicts	the	respondents’	response	to	the	range	of	statements:
Source: Survey results from 15 subsidised operators
Note: The combined responses of respondents (per issue) were averaged for each issue area
Figure 3: Stumbling blocks related to the implementation of the contracting system
Figure 3 reveals that the funding of services remains the main stumbling block in the 
implementation of the contracting system (4.67 average rating) together with complexities 
in involving taxi and small non-subsidised bus operators in the contracting system (4.47 
average rating). Finn and Walters (2010: 358) mention, based on Kumurage, Weerawardena 
and Piyasekera, (2009); Kumurage, Bandara, and Munasinghe (2010); and Schalekamp and 
Behrens (2010), the complexities of incorporating these operators in formal operations 
by	stating	that	‘It	[informal	and	small	vehicle	transit]	has	usually	grown	in	an	organic	and	
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unregulated manner, and cannot be expected to function in the same manner as corporatised 
operators’.	The	complexities	of	involving	small	and	informal	operators	in	formal	contracting	
regimens in South Africa has been a point of debate for a long time with no solutions 
evident in the short term.
Other important factors are the cost associated with the implementation of integrated 
transport plans (also involving unsubsidised operators and services currently operated by 
subsidised operators but without subsidy); a lack of funds at provincial level to implement 
a tendering system; and a lack of funds at national level to implement a tendering system 
(4.40 average rating). Additional issues revolve around the inadequate escalation of costs in 
the contracting system and funding issues over longer-term contracts (7 and 12 years). It is 
clear	that	operators	believe	that	the	contracting	system’s	funding	issues	are	overwhelming	
and a major stumbling block towards the implementation of the contracting system in 
public transport in the country. 
3. Major issues regarding the implementation of a competitive tendering system
As mentioned earlier in this paper, the last competitive public transport tenders were 
awarded in 2002. Since then only a small number of negotiated contracts were concluded. 
Competitive tendering remains government policy but it is evident that the process had 
stalled for various reasons, some of which were mentioned earlier on.
Respondents were required to express their views on the major issues related to the further 
implementation of the tendering system. The responses are included in Figure 4.
Source: Survey results from 15 subsidised operators
Note: The combined responses of respondents (per issue) were averaged for each issue area
Figure 4: Major issues in the further introduction of a  
competitive tendering system in South Africa
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As could be expected the funding issues (4.40 average rating) and the complexity of the 
integration of informal public transport services into a formal tendering system (4.27 and 
4.21 average rating respectively) represent the main issues in the further implementation 
of the tendering system. The lack of human capacity to implement the system (4.20 
average rating) together with a lack of consistency of approach between various provincial 
governments (4.13 average rating) also feature high on the list of issues. 
4. Operators’ views on negotiated contracts
The negotiation of contracts for the rendering of public transport services were first 
incorporated into the National Land Transport Transition Act of 2000. There were however 
significant conditions attached and it was really only meant as a transformational tool to 
assist in black ownership development and growth and to assist previously disadvantaged 
individuals. In replacement legislation enacted in 2009, the NLTTA was amended to make 
provision for the negotiation of services in addition to the competitive tendering system. 
Since the enactment of the National Land Transport Act, the DoT has agreed, as an interim 
measure, to negotiate all services following the difficulty of convincing labour (among 
others) of the merits of the competitive tendering system. 
The	main	 ‘motivator’	 therefore	 in	 South	Africa	 to	 negotiate	 contracts	 appears	 to	 be	 to	
overcome	 resistance	 of	 organised	 labour’s	 opposition	 towards	 tenders.	 It	 is	 proposed	
however, that the international evidence of the efficacy of negotiated contracts in public 
transport also be considered. Hensher and Stanley (2010) report that in the Australian 
experience, across all jurisdictions that tender and those that negotiate, that there is a 
tendency for costs to converge and that this underlines the importance of negotiation as 
an alternative approach. 
The survey results indicate that most operators (85.7%) are in favour of negotiated contracts 
where the authority carries the revenue risk and 57.1% where the operator carries the 
revenue risk. Only 33.3% of operators are in favour of the current form of net cost tendering 
where	the	operator	carries	the	revenue	risk.	Figure	5	depicts	the	operators’	preferences	for	
negotiated contracts.
Source: Survey results from 15 subsidised operators
Figure 5:	Operators’	preference	for	respective	contract	types
48
Journal of Transport and Supply Chain Management | 2012
5. Major issues regarding the further implementation of negotiated contracts
As it is current policy to negotiate the next round of contracts, operators were required 
to rate a range of issues that would influence the further implementation of negotiated 
contracts in the country. These issues are depicted in Figure 6.
Source: Survey results from 15 subsidised operators
Note: The combined responses of respondents (per issue) were averaged for each issue area
Figure 6: Major issues regarding the further implementation of negotiated contracts
The largest concern that respondents had (4.60 average rating) was that it was generally 
expected by government during discussions about the tendering system, that operators 
‘give	away’	as	much	as	40%	of	their	existing	businesses	to	taxi	and	small	bus	operators	as	
the current level of funding was inadequate to fund all of the currently unsubsidised services. 
Once again, the major concern about the funding of the contracting system surfaces in these 
opinions. Government is under tremendous pressure to include at least the taxi industry in 
future public transport contracts but cannot afford the financial impact that this may have 
on	the	country.	Therefore	it	aims	to	‘disown’	a	part	of	the	current	subsidised	bus	services	
and	 transfer	 these	services	 to	 these	operators	 to	satisfy	at	 least	a	part	of	 that	 industry’s	
requirement for a subsidy. This approach is not in line with its White Paper objective of 
growing	public	 transport	 services	 as	 this	 step	only	 involves	 the	 ‘sharing’	 of	 current	 bus	
passengers between the existing bus operators and the taxi industry by forcing the bus 
industry	to	‘give	up’	some	of	its	services	to	the	taxi	industry.	
49
Problems with the Implementation of Bus Transport Contracting in South Africa
The next major issue was the fact that no bus company has been allowed to add any new 
routes to its current network since 2002 as a result of a governmental moratorium on the 
expansion of bus services. In their workshop report Stanley and Longva (2010:82) state that 
for a successful contractual setting all workshop participants were strongly of the belief that 
‘in all circumstances (the emphasis of the authors) an operator should be encouraged to 
grow	patronage	(e.g.	by	means	such	as	optimising	use	of	the	existing	network)’.	Sadly,	in	
South Africa, bus operators are not allowed to pursue this objective in their current contracts 
due to a lack of funds. This is further underlined by the fact that operators operating under 
interim contracts were, in 2009, forced to change their passenger-based subsidy system 
to one based on kilometres (South African Government, 2009) so that government could 
restrain subsidy payments by limiting the kilometres that these buses operate on their 
respective contracts. Under pressure from communities many operators had to resort to 
operating unsubsidised services in these instances which place tremendous pressure on 
their balance sheets. It is expected that these services will have to be included in future 
contract designs.
Funding issues surfaced again in that 67% of the respondents gave a very important (5) 
rating indicating their concerns about the funding of negotiated contracts over seven to 12 
year periods (4.47 average rating). The current budget funding cycle of Treasury is based 
on a three-year planning cycle which is clearly too short to fund longer term contracts. This 
matter has as yet not been resolved.
The tendency of government to favour the taxi industry also came out as a concern (4.33 
average rating) and the difficulty of involving this industry in formal negotiations regarding 
negotiated contracts (4.40 average rating). Issues such as the complexity of expected 
negotiations and the negotiation process; an inappropriate risk share between government 
and operators (relating to inadequate escalation formulae in the respective contracts); and 
the lack of an understanding of the complexity of multi-modal transport systems were also 
highlighted by the respondents.
6. Drivers of the complexity of the current contracting system
To obtain a general impression of the main complexity drivers of the current contracting 
system, as depicted in Table I, respondents were required to indicate to which extent they 
would disagree (1), agree (2) and highly agree (3) with a range of statements regarding 
issues that were perceived to drive the complexity of the contracting system. Figure 7 
shows the perceptions of respondents on the main complexity drivers of the current 
contracting system.
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Source: Survey results from 15 subsidised operators
Note: The combined responses of respondents (per issue) were averaged for each issue area
Figure 7: Drivers of the complexity of the current contracting system 
The results of Figure 7 indicate that the main concerns revolve around (1) funding (2.73 
average rating); (2) the complexity of the negotiation process when involving informal 
sector operators in the contracting system (2.67 average rating); (3) inadequate escalation 
formulae in the contracting system (2.47 average rating); (4) the inability of passengers 
to pay an economic fare (2.47 average rating); (5) pressure to include presently excluded 
operators into the subsidy system in future (2.47 average rating); (6) modal integration 
objectives (2.47 average rating); (7) fraudulent practices at the implementation agency 
level (2.40 average rating) and (8) human capacity to implement a contracting system (2.40 
average rating). 
In summary, from the operator survey it can be gleaned that the main stumbling blocks to 
the implementation of the contracting system in the country can be seen in Table IV. 
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Table IV: Summary of the most important issues regarding the implementation of the 
contracting	system	(operators’	perspective)
Rank
Governance 
issues
Contract system 
issues
Competitive 
tendering issues
Negotiated 
contract issues
Drivers of 
complexity
1
Inability of permit 
offices to deal 
effectively with 
operator licences
Contract designs 
based on the 
availability of 
funds and not the 
real demand for 
services
Funding issues 
(availability 
to fund PT 
operations)
The expectation 
that existing bus 
operators must 
‘give	away’	a	
portion of their 
businesses
Funding 
constraints 
imposed by 
National Treasury
2
Lack of continuity 
at the provincial 
level of 
government
Complexities 
of involving 
taxi operators 
and SMME bus 
operators in 
the contracting 
system
Complexities 
in integrated 
bus and taxi 
operations in 
tender design
The big disparity 
in the scope of 
bus operations 
that need to be 
accommodated in 
future contracts
The complexity 
of arriving at 
an acceptable 
solution with 
formal and less 
formal industries
3
Lack of policy 
direction at the 
provincial level of 
government
The cost 
associated 
with the 
implementation 
of the ITPs
Complexities 
in integrating 
various operators 
in ITPs
Funding issues 
over 7 and 12 
year contracts
Cost increases 
not adequately 
covered in 
the respective 
escalation 
formulae
4
Slow progress 
made with 
integrated 
transport plans
Lack of funds at 
provincial level 
to implement 
the tendering/
contracting 
system
Lack of capacity 
to implement a 
tendering system 
at the local level 
of government
Involving the 
taxi industry in 
negotiations for 
future contracts
The inability of 
passengers to pay 
an economic fare
5
Lack of direction 
on the integration 
of transport 
modes in a single 
public transport 
system
Lack of funds at 
national level 
to implement 
the tendering/
contracting 
system
Lack of 
consistency 
in approach 
and policy 
implementation 
between various 
provinces
Concerns about 
the fair treatment 
of bus operators 
versus taxi 
operators
Pressure to 
include operators 
outside of 
the current 
contracting 
system
Source: Survey results from 15 subsidised operators
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The findings of Mitchell (2009) and the results of the survey among the 15 subsidised 
operators reveal a high level of similarity. The current public transport policy is not being 
implemented for a variety of reasons, the most notable ones being: 
•	 lack	of	funding	to	fund	the	policy	implementation
•	 lack	of	capacity	to	implement	the	chosen	policy
•	 major	operational	issues	in	the	permit	offices
•	 lack	of	policy	direction	at	provincial	levels	of	government
•	 complexities	 regarding	 the	 integration	 of	 the	 informal	 taxi	 services	 into	 a	 formal	
subsidised industry
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•	 the	 lack	 of	 progress	made	with	 the	 development	 and	 implementation	 of	 integrated	
transport plans.
So what are the solutions? The funding of public transport is a political decision that 
can only be resolved at that level. Without adequate funding public transport cannot be 
improved, plans cannot be implemented and human capacity cannot be built. It is also 
important to be truthful as to what can be realistically expected by way of policy objectives. 
Maybe the envisaged public transport plans are too ambitious for South Africa in its current 
developmental state. 
How can one expect all these structures to respond adequately to the policy imperatives? 
One potential solution would be to create more capacity at provincial and national DoT 
levels to assist these structures to develop such plans but then the capacity to implement 
and monitor such plans also need to be enhanced at these levels. At the metro levels 
it will assist greatly if properly structured and capacitated formal transport authorities 
could be established that will have the necessary capacity to plan, implement and monitor 
integrated transport plans. The current over-reliance on consultants to develop these 
plans does not provide long-term stability and capacity. For instance when the consultants 
withdraw, momentum is lost and plans are not implemented. Such authorities need to 
have skills such as in engineering, transport planning, urban planning, transport economics, 
financial management, contract design and management, operational experience, social 
development, environmental management and marketing. Such dedicated structures could 
provide the long-term stability that public transport needs in the country and provide the 
necessary stimulus to implement the policy goals. The long-term funding of these plans 
need to be addressed, however. It is also important that clarity be obtained about the role 
that the respective modes of transport need to play in future. The current policy statements 
are too ambiguous and not well thought through and so cause uncertainty and distrust. 
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